00451nas a2200157 4500008004100000245003300041210003300074260003200107300001000139100002000149700001900169700001900188700001800207700001800225856005000243 2017 eng d00aTemporal Justification Logic0 aTemporal Justification Logic bOpen Publishing Association a59-741 aBucheli, Samuel1 aGhari, Meghdad1 aStuder, Thomas1 aGhosh, Sujata1 aRamanujam, R. uhttp://www.iam.unibe.ch/ltgpub/2017/bgs17.pdf01259nas a2200193 4500008004100000245005300041210005300094300001400147490000700161520069100168653002000859653002800879653002400907653002500931100002000956700001900976700001900995856005101014 2014 eng d00aRealizing Public Announcements by Justifications0 aRealizing Public Announcements by Justifications a1046-10660 v803 aModal public announcement logics study how beliefs change after public announcements. However, these logics cannot express the reason for a new belief. Justification logics fill this gap since they can formally represent evidence and justifications for an agent's belief. We present ${\sf OPAL(K)}$ and ${\sf JPAL(K)}$, two alternative justification counterparts of Gerbrandy–Groeneveld's public announcement logic ${\sf PAL(K)}$. We show that ${\sf PAL(K)}$ is the forgetful projection of both ${\sf OPAL(K)}$ and ${\sf JPAL(K)}$. We also establish that ${\sf JPAL(K)}$ partially realizes ${\sf PAL(K)}$. The question whether a similar result holds for ${\sf OPAL(K)}$ is still open.10aBelief revision10aDynamic epistemic logic10ajustification logic10aPublic announcements1 aBucheli, Samuel1 aKuznets, Roman1 aStuder, Thomas uhttp://www.iam.unibe.ch/ltgpub/2012/bks12a.pdf01408nas a2200241 4500008004100000245005200041210005200093260001300145300001200158490000900170520073600179653001700915653001500932653002400947100002000971700001900991700001901010700002501029700002301054700002001077700001901097856005001116 2013 eng d00aDecidability for Justification Logics Revisited0 aDecidability for Justification Logics Revisited bSpringer a166-1810 v77583 aJustification logics are propositional modal-like logics that instead of statements \emph{$A$ is known} include statements of the form \emph{$A$ is known for reason $t$} where the term $t$ can represent an informal justification for $A$ or a formal proof of $A$. In our present work, we introduce model-theoretic tools, namely: filtrations and a certain form of generated submodels, in the context of justification logic in order to obtain decidability results. Apart from reproving already known results in a uniform way, we also prove new results. In particular, we use our submodel construction to establish decidability for a justification logic with common knowledge for which so far no decidability proof was available.10adecidability10afiltration10ajustification logic1 aBucheli, Samuel1 aKuznets, Roman1 aStuder, Thomas1 aBezhanishvili, Guram1 aLöbner, Sebastian1 aMarra, Vincenzo1 aRichter, Frank uhttp://www.iam.unibe.ch/ltgpub/2013/bks13.pdf00377nas a2200097 4500008004100000245004700041210004700088260007400135100002000209856005000229 2012 eng d00aJustification Logics with Common Knowledge0 aJustification Logics with Common Knowledge aInstitut für Informatik und angewandte MathematikbUniversität Bern1 aBucheli, Samuel uhttp://www.iam.unibe.ch/ltgpub/2012/buc12.pdf00447nas a2200157 4500008004100000245004000041210004000081300001000121490000700131100002000138700001900158700001900177700002200196700002000218856005100238 2011 eng d00aJustifications for Common Knowledge0 aJustifications for Common Knowledge a35-600 v211 aBucheli, Samuel1 aKuznets, Roman1 aStuder, Thomas1 aGoranko, Valentin1 aJamroga, Wojtek uhttp://www.iam.unibe.ch/ltgpub/2011/bks11a.pdf00475nas a2200157 4500008004100000245005500041210005500096300001000151490000900161100002000170700001900190700001900209700002100228700001700249856005100266 2011 eng d00aPartial Realization in Dynamic Justification Logic0 aPartial Realization in Dynamic Justification Logic a35-510 v66421 aBucheli, Samuel1 aKuznets, Roman1 aStuder, Thomas1 aBeklemishev, Lev1 aQueiroz, Ruy uhttp://www.iam.unibe.ch/ltgpub/2011/bks11b.pdf01271nas a2200133 4500008004100000245005200041210005200093260001900145520088000164100002001044700001901064700001901083856003501102 2010 eng d00aExplicit Evidence Systems with Common Knowledge0 aExplicit Evidence Systems with Common Knowledge barXiv.orgcmay3 aJustification logics are epistemic logics that explicitly include justifications for the agents' knowledge. We develop a multi-agent justification logic with evidence terms for individual agents as well as for common knowledge. We define a Kripke-style semantics that is similar to Fitting's semantics for the Logic of Proofs $\mathsf{LP}$. We show the soundness, completeness, and finite model property of our multi-agent justification logic with respect to this Kripke-style semantics. We demonstrate that our logic is a conservative extension of Yavorskaya's minimal bimodal explicit evidence logic, which is a two-agent version of $\mathsf{LP}$. We discuss the relationship of our logic to the multi-agent modal logic $\mathsf{S4}$ with common knowledge. Finally, we give a brief analysis of the coordinated attack problem in the newly developed language of our logic.1 aBucheli, Samuel1 aKuznets, Roman1 aStuder, Thomas uhttp://arxiv.org/abs/1005.048401023nas a2200193 4500008004100000245002800041210002800069260004300097300001200140520049200152100002000644700001900664700001700683700001700700700001900717700002100736700002000757856005200777 2010 eng d00aJustified Belief Change0 aJustified Belief Change bUniversity of the Basque Country Press a135-1553 aJustification Logic is a framework for reasoning about evidence and justification. Public Announcement Logic is a framework for reasoning about belief changes caused by public announcements. This paper develops JPAL, a dynamic justification logic of public announcements that corresponds to the modal theory of public announcements due to Gerbrandy and Groeneveld. JPAL allows us to reason about evidence brought about by and changed by Gerbrandy–Groeneveld-style public announcements.1 aBucheli, Samuel1 aKuznets, Roman1 aRenne, Bryan1 aSack, Joshua1 aStuder, Thomas1 aArrazola, Xabier1 aPonte, Mar\'ıa uhttp://www.iam.unibe.ch/ltgpub/2010/bkrss10.pdf01052nas a2200181 4500008004100000245003300041210003300074260001300107300001000120520057200130653001700702100002000719700001900739700001900758700002100777700002100798856005100819 2010 eng d00aTwo Ways to Common Knowledge0 aTwo Ways to Common Knowledge bElsevier a83-983 aIt is not clear what a system for evidence-based common knowledge should look like if common knowledge is treated as a greatest fixed point. This paper is a preliminary step towards such a system. We argue that the standard induction rule is not well suited to axiomatize evidence-based common knowledge. As an alternative, we study two different deductive systems for the logic of common knowledge. The first system makes use of an induction axiom whereas the second one is based on co-inductive proof theory. We show the soundness and completeness for both systems.10aproof theory1 aBucheli, Samuel1 aKuznets, Roman1 aStuder, Thomas1 aBolander, Thomas1 aBraüner, Torben uhttp://www.iam.unibe.ch/ltgpub/2010/bks10a.pdf00477nas a2200097 4500008004100000245012500041210006900166260007400235100002000309856005000329 2008 eng d00aExplicit Mathematics with Positive Existential Stratified Comprehension, Join and Uniform Monotone Inductive Definitions0 aExplicit Mathematics with Positive Existential Stratified Compre aInstitut für Informatik und angewandte MathematikbUniversität Bern1 aBucheli, Samuel uhttp://www.iam.unibe.ch/ltgpub/2008/buc08.pdf